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In Search of Equality in Legal Education:
The Grutter v. Bollinger Case
Rudy Sandoval*
Laura Lisa Sandoval
"Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of
one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."
-Justice O'Connor,'
June 23, 2003
I. Introduction
It was the hope for many that the segregation which had
permeated American society and its laws for over two hundred
years would soon be eradicated; it was the aspiration of millions
of minorities to be able to walk through the guarded gates of
academia to receive the coveted benefits of education, careers,
and social acceptance; and it was the dream of many that
America would finally fulfill the promises found in the cher-
ished documents of the Declaration of Independence, the Con-
stitution, and the Bill of Rights. Affirmative action was
expected to bring these promises to fruition. This article is a
critical analysis of the latest Supreme Court decision concern-
ing the transformation of affirmative action programs, from
their conception to their current status in higher education. It
begins with a short history of affirmative action and thereafter
evaluates Barbara Grutter's challenge of the constitutionality of
the admissions program at the University of Michigan Law
* Professor Rudy Sandoval, M.A., J.D., L.L.M. Associate Vice President for
Administration and Associate Professor of Law at The University of Texas at San
Antonio. He is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame and Harvard Law
School and is a former law professor of the University of San Diego School of Law
and Notre Dame Law School. Laura Lisa Sandoval is a graduate of Amherst Col-
lege, Associate Editor of the Amherst Review, and worked for the Center for Jus-
tice and International Law, an organization that brings Human Rights cases
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Washington, D.C.).
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
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School. The article then deconstructs and articulates the issues
within the Fourteenth Amendment, and in particular, the use of
race in higher education admissions and diversityas a compel-
ling governmental interest.
II. A Short History of Affirmative Action
The concept of affirmative action first appeared in 1961
when President Kennedy issued an Executive Order creating
the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity stating that
projects financed by federal funds "take affirmative action to en-
sure that applicants are employed ... without regard to their
race, creed, color or national origin."2 Three years later, Presi-
dent Johnson reinforced the concept by ensuring the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which also prohibited discrimina-
tion of all kinds based on race, color, religion or national origin. 3
The following year, he articulated the original meaning of af-
firmative action in a speech at Howard University.
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you
are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose
the leaders you please. You do not take a person who, for years,
has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the
starting line of a race and then say, "you are free to compete with
all the others," and still justly believe that you have been com-
pletely fair .... We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We
seek not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a
right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.4
That same year, President Johnson issued an Executive
Order that required government contractors to "take affirma-
tive action" towards minority employees in all aspects of hiring
and employment.5 In 1967, the Order was amended to include
2. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961) [hereinafter
Kennedy].
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. 241,
255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000 (2000)).
4. Lyndon Baines Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University:
To Fulfill These Rights, 2 Pub. Papers 634 (June 4, 1965), available at http://www.
lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp (last updated
Feb. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Johnson] (emphasis added).
5. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), available at http://
www.dol.gov/esa/regs/statutes/ofccp/eol 1246.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). The
Order states that
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discrimination on the basis of gender. 6 Shortly thereafter, the
Secretary of Labor, Arthur Fletcher, observed that in Philadel-
phia, "[tihe craft unions and the construction industry are ...
openly hostile towards letting blacks into their closed circle"
7
causing President Richard Nixon to issue the "Philadelphia
Plan," which required federal contractors to show "affirmative
action" to meet the predetermined goal of increasing minority
employment.8
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The con-
tractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed,
and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
6. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1969), amended by Exec. Or-
der No. 12,106, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,053 (1978) (providing for the adoption and imple-
mentation of equal employment opportunity), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,087,
63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (1998), and amended by Exec. Order No. 13,152, 65 Fed. Reg.
26,115 (2000) (requiring nondiscrimination on the basis of sex in education pro-
grams). In pertinent part, Executive Order No. 11,478 § 1 states that:
It is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal op-
portunity in Federal employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination
in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and to
promote the full realization of equal employment opportunity through a con-
tinuing affirmative program in each executive department and agency.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. Borgna Brunner, Bakke and Beyond: A History and Timeline of Affirmative
Action, available at http://www.uis.edu/multiculturalstudentaffairs/bakke-and_
beyond.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
8. See Dean J. Kotlowski, Richard Nixon and the Origins of Affirmative Action
(1998), available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf dls/m2082/n3_v60/20649393/
p7/article.jhtml?term= (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). In 1969 under the Nixon Admin-
istration, the Labor Department sought to knock down barriers to blacks seeking
jobs in the booming, high-paying, and largely white construction industry by pro-
moting voluntary minority-hiring agreements between unions and contractors.
There were some impressive results but progress was slow; to accelerate the pro-
cess the Department adopted the "Philadelphia Plan." Based on a similar plan
devised during the Johnson Administration but never implemented, the Philadel-
phia Plan set a range of percentages of minority hiring with which contractors
would be required to make a "good faith" effort to comply. When ordered into effect
in September 1969 in its namesake city, the plan aroused controversy and heated
opposition. Congress considered but rejected legislation to ban it. In February
1970 the Department announced the plan would be extended to other cities unless
they devised their own procedures for ending job discrimination in the construction
industry. Developed with assistance from the Department, "hometown" solutions
were adopted in many cities. Under these plans, local contractors, unions and mi-
nority organizations signed equal opportunity agreements covering private as well
as federally funded construction. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
3
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The doors to the hallowed halls of professional educational
opportunities also began to open for minorities, but the issue
here was different because professional schools only had a lim-
ited number of seats for an entering class. For this reason, it
was not only a matter of opening the doors for minorities in pro-
fessional schools, but it was also a matter of consequently limit-
ing the number of non-minority students. In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke the Supreme Court imposed a
limitation on affirmative action to ensure that providing greater
opportunities for minorities did not come at the expense of the
individual rights of the non-minority students.9 The case in-
volved the university's medical school, which had two separate
admission pools-one for standard applicants, and the other for
minorities and economically disadvantaged students.'0 Each
school year, the school reserved sixteen slots for minorities and
economically disadvantaged students." Justice Powell, in the
Bakke case, held that the use of these inflexible quotas for set-
aside admissions was unacceptable and thereby declared that
the dual affirmative action program was unconstitutional if it
led to reverse discrimination.12 The Bakke court also planted
grams (OFCCP) coordinated these and other equal opportunity efforts and helped
to improve their management. In 1970, it was extended to non-construction fed-
eral contractors. Id.
9. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978); see gener-
ally Borgna Brunner, Timeline of Affirmative Action Milestones, available at http:ll
www.infoplease.com/spotaffirmativetimelinel.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2003)(outlining the sequence of affirmative events that occurred from Executive Order
10,925 to Grutter).
10. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273-74.
11. Id. at 275.
12. 438 U.S. at 289; see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273 (1976) (stating that two white employees and one black employee were
charged with stealing property from their employer. The two white employees
were fired while the black employee was retained. In the first reverse discrimina-
tion case, the Court decided that Title VII is not limited to discrimination against
minority persons, but includes discriminatory actions against majority persons as
well); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)
(striking down the race-conscious admissions program of the University of Texas
Law School. The school used lower minimum criteria for African American and
Mexican American candidates than for other candidates. The Court held contrary
to Bakke that obtaining a racially diverse student body is not a compelling interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Middletown v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396 (6th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1196 (1997) (stating that white police officers
were passed over for promotions because of voluntary affirmative action plan in-
volving a 50% set aside of promotions to Sergeant for racial minorities. The court
[Vol. 25:91
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the seed that would fully develop in Grutter -that race could
serve as a factor in admissions and that the inclusion of minor-
ity students would create a diverse student body that would be
beneficial to the educational environment as a whole.
13
Yet, while race could still be used as a factor in admissions
and job selection, the focus of the criticism against affirmative
action was primarily directed at quotas. In Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, the Court reversed directions and upheld a federal law re-
quiring that 15% of funds for public works be set aside for
qualified minority contractors, stating that the "narrowed focus
and limited extent" of the affirmative action program did not
violate the rights of the non-minority, 1 and that there was no
"allocation of federal funds according to inflexible percentages
solely based on race or ethnicity."' 5 In other words, flexible quo-
tas were acceptable as long as they were narrowly focused and
limited.16 Nevertheless, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, when a school board hiring goals policy caused the protec-
tion of minorities from being laid off while non-minorities with
found the plan to be an "unnecessarily drastic remedy"); Police Ass'n of New Orle-
ans v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the city's
race conscious promotions violated Equal Protection Clause because they were not
narrowly tailored); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (requiring an addi-
tional showing for white plaintiffs in reverse discrimination cases over and above
what would be required by minority plaintiffs. The court held that because racial
discrimination against white persons is so rare, in order to establish the necessary
inference of discrimination, white plaintiffs must prove "background circum-
stances" that "support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer
who discriminates against the majority"); Lucas v. Dole, 835 F.2d 532 (4th Cir.
1987) (refusing to adopt the D.C. Circuit's "background circumstances" require-
ment and instead applied the McDonnell Douglas test in the same way to white
and black plaintiffs. The white plaintiff satisfied her burden in this case where she
showed that she was more qualified than the selected minority applicant, that the
interviewing process was too subjective, that the minority applicant had received
irregular acts of favoritism, and that other employees believed that race was a
factor).
13. 438 U.S. 265.
14. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 456 (1980) (stating that minority set-
aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power). The Court found
that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise pro-
gram under the Spending Power. Id. The plurality opinion noted that Congress
could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects
under the Commerce Clause as well. Id. The Court further held that in the reme-
dial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion." Id. at
482.
15. Id. at 473.
16. Id. at 456.
5
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more seniority were discharged, the Court found that the injury
caused to non-minorities could not justify the benefits to minori-
ties. 17 The issue was thereafter framed as benefits to minorities
versus injuries to non-minorities.
There was one last effort to show that affirmative action
programs were still needed in some parts of America. In 1987, a
federal court found that the State of Alabama Department of
Public Safety systematically discriminated against blacks in
hiring because "[iun the thirty-seven year history of the patrol
there has never been a black trooper." 8 The federal district
court ordered the state to reform its practices.' 9 Twelve years
later, the State continued its pervasive discriminatory exclusion
of blacks.20 The federal district court ordered blacks to be hired
until 25% of the upper ranks were composed of blacks.2' The
quota was challenged, and in United States v. Paradise the Su-
preme Court upheld the use of strict quotas to correct the de-
partment's overt and defiant racism.22 But several years later,
in 1989, the City of Richmond, Virginia was challenged for pro-
moting a program setting aside 30% of the city's construction
funds for black owners.23 The court stated that "an amorphous
claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular
industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota."24
Furthermore, the court stated that there is simply no way of
determining which aspects of public decision making regarding
affirmative action "are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifi-
cations are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial in-
feriority or simple racial politics." 25 The court added that strict
scrutiny was necessary to ascertain the outcome of the city's ob-
jective: "[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegiti-
mate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
17. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1986).
18. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 154 (1987).
19. Id. at 162.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 163.
22. Id. at 187.
23. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also Rodol-
pho Sandoval, An Analysis of the New Legal Model for Establishing Set-Aside Pro-
grams for Minority Business Enterprise: The Case of City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 25 GoNz. L. REV. 141 (1990).
24. Richmond, 488 U.S. at 499.
25. Id. at 493.
[Vol. 25:91
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pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool," 26 i.e. affirmative action. "The test also ensures
that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classifica-
tion was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype."27 The fun-
damental rationale and the original purpose for affirmative
action as articulated by President Johnson in 1965 were
changed forever.28
Notwithstanding the fact that Bakke had prohibited having
two separate admissions pools in 1978, the University of Texas
Law School established one pool for minorities and one for non-
minorities. 29 The response was swift. Cheryl Hopwood sued the
University of Texas Law School and challenged the affirmative
action program alleging unfair preference towards less qualified
minorities applicants. 30 In Hopwood v. Texas,31 the Fifth Cir-
cuit suspended the program claiming that Bakke was wrongly
decided, that diversity was not a legitimate goal, and educa-
tional diversity is not recognized as a compelling state inter-
est.32 Subsequently, the Attorney General of Texas extended
the ruling to all Texas public universities, stating that they
should employ race-neutral criteria. 33 Upon appeal, the Su-
preme Court rejected the case and allowed the decision to
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Johnson, supra note 4.
29. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 558 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
30. Id.
31. Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir.), affg 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.
Tex. 1994).
32. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551; see also Gerald Torres, Symposium: On Grut-
ter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity" in Education: Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v.
Bollinger: View from a Limestone Ledge, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1596-97 (2003).
Torres states that
The Hopwood v. Texas decision was breathtaking in its disdain for the Su-
preme Court's educational equal protection jurisprudence. That disdain was
combined with the ... proviso... in which the Fifth Circuit threatened indi-
vidual liability if race were smuggled back into the decisionmaking process.
This was reinforced by the then Texas Attorney General's opinion that the
case was rightly decided and should be interpreted expansively to cover
recruiting, financial aid, and the like.
Id.
33. Effect of Hopwood v. Texas on Various Scholarship Programs of the Uni-
versity of Houston, 97 Op. Att'y Gen. 001 (1997), available at http://www.oag.state.
tx.us/opinions/lo48morales/lo97-001.htm (Feb. 5, 1997).
20041
7
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:91
stand.34 Thirty-five years of work on affirmative action efforts
were quietly dismantled in the Fifth Circuit, which includes the
states of Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. 35 The three years
following the Hopwood case saw the dismantling of affirmative
action programs by the states with the largest number of His-
panics in the United States, namely California,36 Washington, 37
and Florida.38
,On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court, in the most impor-
tant case addressing the issue of race in education since Bakke,
in a 5 to 4 decision, upheld the University of Michigan Law
School admission policy 39 where the Supreme Court moved
"From Affirmative Action to Affirming Diversity."40 This article
is an analysis of the Grutter v. Bollinger4' case.
34. See Hopwood, 21 F.3d 603, cert. denied, No. 00-1609, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
4722 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1998).
35. See generally Hopwood, 21 F.3d 603.
36. Cal. Const. art. I, § 31, also known as "California Proposition 209" (Nov.
1997), available at http://vote96.ss.Ca.govNote96/html/BP/209text.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 3, 2004) (The Proposition was passed on Nov. 6 by 54% of California vot-
ers). The proposition states:
The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting. . . . [but] c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as
prohibiting bona fide qualifications based on sex which are reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of public employment, public education, or
public contracting.
Id.
37. See Adversity.net, Washington State Initiative 200 Ends Racial Quotas!,
available at http://www.adversity.net/i200.htm#i200text (last visited Oct. 3, 2004);
see also ROBERT HOLLAND, WASHINGTON POLICY CENTER, TowARD AN EQUAL Soci.
ETY: MAKING INITIATIVE 200 WORK, available at http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/
ECP/PBHollandECPMakingI200Work.html (May 1999) On November 3, 1998,
Washington state voters passed Initiative 200, the Washington State Civil Rights
Initiative. The measure passed by 58.2% of the 1.9 million votes cast.
38. See Governor Jeb Bush's "One Florida" initiative (Feb. 2000), available at
http://www.state.fl.us/eog/executive-orders/1999/november/eo99-281.html (Nov. 9,
1999) (Governor Jeb Bush signed an executive order on November 9th that would
eliminate the use of race and ethnicity in admissions and contracting decisions. It
basically eliminated Affirmative Action by doing away with race-sensitive admis-
sions policies and contracting).
39. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
40. See generally R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., From Affirmative Action to Af-
firming Diversity, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990.
41. 539 U.S. 306.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss1/4
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III. The Grutter v. Bollinger Case
A. The Grutter Facts
The University of Michigan Law School follows an official
admissions policy that seeks to achieve student body diversity
through compliance with Bakke.42 Barbara Grutter, a 49 year-
old Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score, sub-
mitted an application for admission to the Law School in 1997.
43
She was initially placed on the waiting list, but was subse-
quently rejected.44 She alleged that [the University of Michi-
gan] discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, [and] 42 U.S.C. § 1981 .. . Petitioner further alleged
that she was rejected because the Law School uses race as a
"predominant" factor, giving applicants who belong to certain
minority groups "a significantly greater chance of admission
than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial
groups;" [and that] respondents "had no compelling interest to
justify their use of race in the admissions process."45 The Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 46 agreed with
the Plaintiff and found the Law School's use of race as an ad-
mission factor unlawful.47 That court applied the strict scrutiny
test and determined that the Law School's asserted interest in
assembling a diverse student body was not compelling because
"'the attainment of a racially diverse class . . .was not recog-
nized as such by Bakke and is not a remedy for past discrimina-
tion."' 48 And even if diversity49 were compelling, the district
42. 438 U.S. 265.
43. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320. See generally David M. White, The Requirement
of Race-Conscious Evaluation of LSAT Score for Equitable Law School Admissions,
12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 400, 403 (2001) (arguing that the LSAT produces a
discriminatory impact significantly greater than can be accounted for on the basis
of prior academic achievement).
44. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
45. Id. at 317 (internal citations omitted).
46. See R. Lawrence Purdy, Prelude: Bakke Revisited, 7 TEx. REV. L. & POL.
313, 328 (outlining the procedural history of the Grutter case).
47. Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (1998) (vacating the injunction
prohibiting the law school from considering race and ethnicity in its admission
decision).
48. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321 (citing Appellant's Application for Cert. at 246a).
20041
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court 50 avers that Michigan Law School had not narrowly tai-
lored its use of race to further that interest.51 Upon appeal by
the Law School, the Sixth Circuit court sitting en banc52 re-
versed the district court's judgment, holding that (1) Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke53 was binding precedent establishing
diversity54 as a compelling state interest;55 (2) that the Law
School's use of race was narrowly tailored56 because race was
merely a "potential 'plus' factor"; and (3) that it was further nar-
rowly tailored because the Law School's program was virtually
identical to the Harvard admissions program described approv-
ingly by Justice Powell and appended to his Bakke opinion57
The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court upon an ap-
peal by the Plaintiff.58 The issue before the Supreme Court was
49. See generally Barbara Lauriat, Trump Card or Trouble? The Diversity Ra-
tionale in Law and Education, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2003) (outlining a his-
tory of "Diversity" in education admission policies).
50. See Purdy, supra note 46, at 328 (discussing the procedural history in the
Grutter case).
51. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321.
52. See also Purdy, supra note 46, at 345-58 (discussing Chief Judge Martin's
majority opinion and Judge Clay's concurring opinion, in addition to Judge Boggs'
analysis of "narrow tailoring," and Judge Gilman's dissent); see generally Police
Ass'n of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing that the city's race conscious promotions violated the Equal Protection Clause
because they were not narrowly tailored).
53. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
54. Cf. Douglass C. Lawrence, Challenging Affirmative Action: Does Diversity
Justify Race-Conscious Admissions Programs? 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 83 (2002)
(tracing affirmative action jurisprudence from Bakke to the present and examining
the judicial uncertainty surrounding the diversity rational).
55. But cf. Ryan C. Idzior, The Sixth Circuit Holds that Diversity in Higher
Education is a Compelling State Interest and that the Admissions Program at the
University of Michigan Law School is Narrowly Tailored to Further That Interest,
56 SMU L. REV. 1031 (2003) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit has endorsed an ad-
missions program that violates students' equal protection rights and impedes the
realization of true diversity).
56. But cf Marianne M. Ibrahim, Oh, The Places You Will Go-Or Not Go:
Balancing the Weight Diversity May Play in Higher Education Admissions Policies
with One Supreme Court Justice's Opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 43 TEx. L. REV.
912, 925 (2002) (arguing that the law school admission policy was not narrowly
tailored).
57. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (2002) (reversing the District Court).
58. Grutter v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss1/4
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whether diversity is a compelling state interest 59 that can jus-
tify the narrowly tailored use of race as a factor in student ad-
missions by the University of Michigan Law School.
60
B. The Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection
Barbara Grutter alleged that the University of Michigan dis-
criminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause6' of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6 2
When legalese is stripped away, the argument is that the uni-
versity discriminates against Whites in favor of Blacks, Native
Americans and Hispanics. The Fourteenth Amendment 63 of the
Constitution of the United States was passed by both houses of
Congress on June 8th, 1866. The irony of the plaintiffs argu-
ment is that the amendment was originally designed to grant
citizenship to and protect the civil liberties of recently freed
slaves.6 4 The amendment prohibited states from denying or
abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, "depriv[ing] any person of [his] life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; [or] deny[ing] to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."65 The amend-
ment by its express terms provides that "[n]o State" and "nor
shall any State" engage in the proscribed conduct.66 "It is State
action of a particular character that is prohibited.... It nullifies
59. Compare Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (holding that diversity is not a compelling
state interest), with Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that diversity is a compelling state interest).
60. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
61. See generally Kevin Joyner, The Use of Race in the Admissions Programs
of Higher Educational Institutions-A Violation of the Equal Protection Clause, 19
CAMPBELL L. REV. 489 (1997) (arguing that the use of race in admissions programs
of higher educational institutions is a violation of the equal protection clause).
62. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Lawrence, supra note 54, at 85 (outlin-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment and the standard of review).
64. See Steve Russell, Seeking Justice: Critical Perspectives of Native People:
A Black and White Issue: The Invisibility of American Indians in Racial Policy
Discourse; 4 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y R. 129, 134 (1999).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Stating that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
20041
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and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every
kind, which... denies to any of them the equal protection of the
laws." 67 The plaintiffs fundamental argument was that the
University of Michigan is a state institution and that its admis-
sion policy denied equal protection under the law to her because
the University discriminated against her on the basis of race. 68
1. Racial Classification
The Supreme Court noted that since the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution
protect[s] persons, not groups ... all governmental action based
on race-a group classification long recognized as "in most cir-
cumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited"-should be sub-
jected to detailed judicial inquiry to guarantee that the personal
right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed. 69
But this is a conclusion that was not very clear thirteen years
ago.70 Nevertheless, the court has concluded that group classifi-
cations are suspect if the classification is by race because "[w]e
are a 'free people whose institutions are founded upon the doc-
trine of equality."' 71 The Constitution does not forbid govern-
ment disparate treatment of groups per se, but the "government
may treat people differently because of their race only for the
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. (emphasis added).
67. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1882).
68. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; see also Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2004).
69. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (internal ci-
tation omitted) (emphasis in original) (The petitioner, who submitted the low bid
on a subcontract but was not certified as having a small disadvantaged business,
filed suit against respondent, federal officials, claiming that the race-based pre-
sumption used in subcontractors' compensation clauses violate the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. The court held that
federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling govern-
mental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.). But cf.,
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (overruling federal racial classifications
to be subject to a less rigorous standard).
70. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
71. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967)). But see Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (stating that "[a]t the very least, the
Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in
criminal statutes [not civil], be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny[.]"' (quoting
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)(emphasis added))).
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most compelling reasons."72 Race-based classification is consti-
tutional73 only if it is narrowly tailored74 to further a compelling
governmental interest.75 Because "[n]ot every [state] decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable ... strict scrutiny is
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the government's reasons for
using race in a particular context." 76 Therefore, racial classifi-
cations77 imposed by the government "must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny."78 Strict scrutiny is ap-
plied to "smoke out" an illegitimate use of race by ensuring that
72. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added).
73. Accord Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see generally, Derrick Bell, Sympo-
sium: On Grutter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity" in Education: Diversity's Dis-
tractions, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1625 n.19 (2003). But cf Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993) (5-4 decision) (O'Connor, J.) (stating that "[a] racial classi-
fication, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be
upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954))).
74. Ibrahim, supra note 56 (analyzing whether the Michigan Law School Pol-
icy was narrowly tailored).
75. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980). Cf Metro Broad., (stating that congressionally mandated benign racial
classifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny. The Court ignored the ex-
planation in Croson, that strict scrutiny of governmental racial classifications is
essential because it may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact
benign and rejected the proposition of congruence between the standard applicable
to federal and state race-based action); But cf Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at
227 (overruling Metro Broad., on these conclusions).
76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ. 476 U.S.
267, 285-86 (1986) (5-4 decision) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "the anal-
ysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity of [a racial] classifica-
tion do not vary simply because the objective appears acceptable to individual
Members of the Court." (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 n.9 (1982)); Bell, supra note 73, at 1626 n.20; Ibrahim, supra note 56, at 914
(elaborating on "The Evolution of the Strict Scrutiny Test in Racial Classifications"
cases).
77. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also San-
doval, supra note 22. Croson established three general propositions with respect
to governmental racial classifications. First, "[any preference based on racial or
ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination." Wygant,
476 U.S. at 273. Second, "the standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification." See Croson 488 U.S. at 494. And finally, "[e]qual protection analy-
sis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976).
78. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227).
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the "government is pursuing a goal important enough to war-
rant use of a highly suspect tool."79
The Court then posits the question of whether the Law
School's admission policy of using race as a classification is jus-
tified by a compelling governmental interest. The Court argues
that the Law School's justification for the use of race is "the ed-
ucational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."80
Therefore, the question becomes whether student body diversity
is a compelling state interest.8 ' Justice O'Connor stated
"[tioday, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest
in attaining a diverse student body."8 2 The Court's rationale
was that such diversity is essential to the Law School's educa-
tional mission.8 3 Justice O'Connor argued that since the Law
School is the entity that creates its mission, the academic deci-
sions should be deferred to the expertise of the school.84
C. Deference to University Academic Decisions
Justice O'Connor stated that universities hold a special place
in our society and that they should be given special deference
with respect to their academic decisions.85 She stated that the
Court will give the university a degree of deference with respect
to its academic decisions, but within constitutionally proscribed
limits. 86 The Court reemphasized the principle that educators'
judgments have "a constitutional dimension, grounded in the
First Amendment, of educational autonomy."87 In other words,
the Court has clothed institutions of higher learning with "edu-
cational autonomy" and the responsibility to fashion a workable
framework to achieve the objectives of diversity through admis-
79. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
80. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
81. Id. Cf Bell, supra note 73, at 1622 (arguing that the concept of diversity is
a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice).
82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.at 329.
86. Id. See also Kermit L. Hall, Speech at the Harvard Graduate School of
Education Affirmative Action Forum, Yes, It is Important to Consider Diversity in
Admission: But Where are the Bridges to Success? (Nov. 1, 2003) (arguing that the
most important feature of the Grutter decision is the Supreme Court's willingness
to defer to the judgment of institutions of higher education) (on file with author).
87. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
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sions programs as long as they are holistic, narrowly tailored,
aimed at forming a critical mass, and stricken of anything re-
sembling a quota.88 In an interesting deviation from the focal
issue, the court decides to make the Law School a constitutional
partner with the responsibilities of determining for itself the de-
gree of diversity necessary to pass muster under the Constitu-
tion. It cites six cases to support the argument for the Law
School's educational autonomy, five of which have little or no
bearing on primary issues before the Court.8 9
First, Justice O'Connor cites Regents of University of Michi-
gan v. Ewing to support the proposition for "giving a degree of
deference to a university academic decision" with respect to
framing a diversified admissions program.90 In Ewing, a stu-
dent was enrolled at the University of Michigan in a 6-year pro-
gram of combined undergraduate and medical education. 91 The
student was dismissed from the program at the medical school
for failing with the lowest score recorded in the history of the
program.9 2 The student sought readmission to the program and
an opportunity to retake the examination, but was refused.9 3 In
the suit, the plaintiff alleged that: (1) he had a property interest
in his continued enrollment in the program, and (2) his dismis-
sal was arbitrary and capricious in violation of his substantive
due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.9 4
The Supreme Court held that assuming that the student had a
property interest in his continued enrollment in the medical
program, his dismissal from the program was not arbitrary and
capricious since the record showed that the decision to dismiss
the student was made conscientiously and with careful deliber-
ation,95 based on an evaluation of the student's entire academic
88. Id.
89. The Court cites Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985);
Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y.,
385 U.S. 589 (1967). Id. at 328-29.
90. Id. at 328.
91. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215.
92. Id. at 216.
93. Id. at 217.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 225 (holding that the court will not overrule the university's decision
"unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
2004]
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career at the university, including his low scores.96 The Court
stated that on matters of "a genuinely academic decision,"97
such as dismissal of a student, the Court "should show great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment."98 The distinc-
tion between Grutter and Ewing is that in Ewing, the Court
grants a degree of deference to the university with respect to
evaluating a student's qualifications and performance for dis-
missal and readmission. This authority is an administrative
power that universities possess to implement and maintain the
integrity of their degree granting function. There are no race,
diversity or equal protection issues in Ewing. In Grutter, the
Court gives deference to the university with respect to creating
an entire admissions framework based on diversity's allowing
racial classification. In other words, it appears as if the Grutter
case has expanded the breadth of the "degree of deference"
given to the university beyond Ewing.
The Court also cites Board of Curators of the University of
Missouri v. Horowitz to support its argument for "giving a de-
gree of deference to a university, academic decision."99 While
Horowitz is similar to Ewing in that a student was dismissed
from medical school because of low performance grades, the is-
sue in Horowitz was not about the authority of the university to
make an academic decision, but rather whether the university
had complied with the procedural protection requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment by dismissing the student, and
whether the student had been deprived of her liberty or prop-
erty interest.100 Justice Rehnquist, who delivered the majority
opinion in Horowitz, stated that the student had been awarded
at least as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quired, since the student had been fully informed of the decision
to dismiss her after careful and deliberate discussions, which
took place without any arbitrariness or capriciousness on the
part of the university. 1 1 The Court argued that "university fac-
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
professional judgment").
96. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 425.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
100. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80.
101. Id. at 92.
106 [Vol. 25:91
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ulties must have the widest range of discretion in making judg-
ments as to the academic performance of students and their
entitlement to promotion or graduation."10 2 Again, while
Horowitz expressly allows the university the "widest range of
discretion," it only does so with respect to student entitlements
in retention and readmission. 10 3 The issue in Horowitz con-
cerned the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Again, Grutter seems to go beyond Horowitz in expanding the
sphere of deference given to university academic decisions.
The Court in Grutter also argued that "universities occupy
a special niche in our constitutional tradition" because it has
"long [been] recognized that.., the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought
[are] associated with the university environment," 10 4 citing
Wieman v. Updegraff'0 5 to support its proposition. In Wieman,
the salary of a faculty employee at Oklahoma State College was
frozen because the employee refused to subscribe to the "loyalty
oath" required by a state statute. 10 6 Justice Clark, delivering
the majority opinion, concluded that the state statute that seeks
to bar a disloyal person from state employment by requiring
employees to disavow membership in or affiliation with speci-
fied organizations violates the constitutional guarantees of free-
102. Id. at 96 n.6.
103. Id.
104. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added); see also Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
stated that "the process of education has naturally enough been the basis of hope
for the perdurance of our democracy on the part of all our great leaders, from
Thomas Jefferson onwards." Wieman, 344 U.S. at 196. Furthermore, he notes
that "'a university is a place that is established and will function for the benefit of
society, provided it is a center of independent thought.'" Id. at 197 (quoting Tax-
Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations: Hearing on H. Res. 561
Before the House Select Comm., 82nd Cong. 2d Sess. (1952) (testimony of Robert M.
Hutchins, Assoc. Dir., Ford Foundation)). The center of independent thought, in
this case, provides the framework for the special niche discussed in Grutter, not-
withstanding the disconnect with the state loyalty oath requirement.
105. See Wieman, 344 U.S. 183.
106. Id. at 186 (stating the loyalty oath, "'[aind I do further swear (or affirm)
that I do not advocate... the overthrow of the Government of the United States
... That I am not affiliated directly or indirectly with the Communist Party... any
foreign political agency... or group whatever which has been officially determined
by the United States Attorney General ... to be a communist front or subversive
organization ...').
1072004]
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dom of thought, speech and press. 0 7 The only educational
institutional connection in Wieman is that the plaintiff, a state
employee, who was asserting his constitutional right of freedom
of thought and speech, also happened to be an employee of the
university.'0 8 He could have been a city employee,109 an em-
ployee at a public school" o or a candidate for office."' Do these
other entities also have a special niche in our constitutional tra-
dition because an employee refuses to subscribe to a loyalty
oath? It is, therefore, difficult to reason from the Wieman case
why "universities occupy a special niche in our constitution."1 2
The Court in Grutter also cited Sweezy," 3 and stated that
"we have long recognized . . .the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought as-
sociated with the university environment" to support the pro-
position that "universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition."114 In Sweezy, a witness refused to an-
swer questions from the Attorney General attempting to enforce
the New Hampshire Subversive Activities Act concerning the
Progressive Party and a lecture given at a state university."15
The Court concluded in Sweezy that the Attorney General's in-
vestigation, licensed under the Subversive Activities Act, "was
an invasion of [the witness's constitutional] liberties in the ar-
eas of academic freedom and political expression ... ,"116 Here,
the only connection that the plaintiff had with the university is
107. Id. at 191.
108. See id. at 185.
109. See Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 724 (1951) (holding that a
Los Angeles ordinance requiring all city employees to swear that they did not ad-
vocate the overthrow of the government by unlawful means and did not belong to
organizations with such objectives is lawful).
110. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 489 (1952) (stating that the State
of New York sought to bar from employment at public schools persons who advo-
cate, or belong to organizations which advocate, the overthrow of the government
by force, violence, or any unlawful means).
111. See Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, 56-57 (1951) (stating that
an oath was required of candidates for public office who sought places on a Mary-
land ballot).
112. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
113. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
114. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
115. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 238.
116. Id. at 250.
108 [Vol. 25:91
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that he delivered a lecture to the faculty and student body. 117
The action does not even involve the university. Taking this ar-
gument to its logical conclusion, one could argue that there are
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with city
councils and public park environments since lectures are often
given there as well. Therefore, city councils and public park en-
vironments also occupy a special niche in our Constitution.
The next case that the Court cites in Grutter to support its
proposition that universities occupy a special niche in our con-
stitution is Shelton v. Tucker."8 In Shelton, an Arkansas stat-
ute required every teacher, as a condition of employment in a
state-supported school or college, to file an affidavit annually
listing without limitation every organization to which he has
belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five
years. 19 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Shelton,
concluded that a statute compelling a teacher to disclose every
associational tie impairs his right to freedom of association,
which is closely tied to freedom of speech, and like free speech,
lies at the foundation of a free society. 20 Grutter emphasized
the "expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with
the university environment" to recognize the special niche that
universities occupy in our Constitution.' 21 But the issue in
Shelton 22 is more closely aligned to the First Amendment right
of freedom of association, than with freedom of speech or
thought. In other words, the Court's argument for "special
niche in our constitution" is left hanging without a connection
between "freedom of association" on the one hand and "special
niche" on the other.
Finally, the Court cites Keyishian v. Board of Regents 23 to
support its proposition that freedom of speech and thought have
been traditionally associated with the university environ-
ment. 24 In this case, the appellant faculty member of the State
University of New York claimed that New York's teacher 10y-
117. See id. at 243.
118. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
119. Id. at 480.
120. Id. at 485-87.
121. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
122. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487.
123. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
124. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
10920041
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alty laws and regulations requiring certification that he was not
a Communist were unconstitutional.125 In the majority opinion
written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that: (1) statutes
requiring or authorizing the removal of faculty members for se-
ditious utterances were unconstitutionally vague because a
"teacher could not know the extent ... to which [the] utterance
must transcend mere statements about abstract doctrine," and
(2) statutes banning state employment of any person advocating
or distributing material which advocates forceful overthrow of
government were unconstitutionally vague as possibly prohibit-
ing advocating the doctrine in the abstract. 126 The issue in
Keyishian is clearly about safeguarding academic freedom. 27
Brennan further states that "First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive,"' 28 and that "the vigilant protection
of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools." 29 The Court concluded that
academic freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment,
which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom."130 Reaching from Keyishian's First Amendment
freedom of speech argument that universities have a special
niche in the constitutional tradition to make academic decisions
with respect to its function to grant degrees to Grutter's conclu-
sion that law schools have a compelling interest to diversify the
student body utilizing race as a factor is a long legal leap. The
Grutter Court concludes by saying that "good faith [on the part
of a university] is presumed in the absence of a showing to the
contrary."131
125. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 592.
126. Id. at 599-600, 605 (stating also that statutes making Communist Party
membership prima facie evidence of disqualification unconstitutionally abridged
freedom of association by not permitting rebuttal by proof of non-active member-
ship or absence of intent to further unlawful aims).
127. Id. at 603.
128. Id. at 604.
129. Id. at 603 (quoting Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487).
130. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
131. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 317-318 (1978).
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D. Diversity As a Compelling State Interest For the Use of
Race
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, states that the
Court "endorse [s] Justice Powell's view [in Bakke] that student
body diversity132 is a compelling state interest that can justify
the use of race in university admissions" 133 because "attaining a
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper
institutional mission." 34 Hence, the Court was able to shift the
issue from the use of affirmative action 35 to admit minorities
into law schools to using diversity 36 as an important factor to
diversify the institution. The Court added that to fulfill its mis-
sion, the Law School has the right to select those students who
will contribute the most to the "robust exchange of ideas."
137
The goal of the Law School is to "assembl[e] a class that is both
exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse." 38 To
achieve this goal the "Law School seeks to enroll a 'critical
132. For an interesting commentary on diversity, critical mass and racial
quotas," see Commentary, The Muddled World of Affirmative Action, W. MAss. L.
TRIB., Oct. 2003, § 4, No. 10, at 15 [hereinafter Muddled].
133. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 330. But see Bell, supra note 73, at 1622. The court states that
the concept of diversity, far from a viable means of ensuring affirmative ac-
tion in the admissions policies of colleges ... is a serious distraction in the
ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice: (1) Diversity enables courts and pol-
icy makers to avoid addressing directly the barriers of race and class that
adversely affect so many applicants; (2) Diversity invites further litigation
by offering a distinction without a real difference; ... (3) Diversity serves to
give undeserved legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test scores
that privilege well-to-do, mainly white applicants; and (4) the... attention
directed at diversity programs diverts concern and resources from the seri-
ous barriers... that exclude ... students from entering college ....
Id.
135. Cf. Muddled, supra note 133 (stating that "the Court's attempt to have
its cake - preserving some role for race in admissions decision - and eat it too - but
no quotas- resulted, . . . in analytic incoherence"); cf Pauline T. Kim, The Color-
blind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) (stating that "the Supreme Court
has once again sent mixed messages about affirmative action, upholding the use of
race by Michigan Law School, but striking down the University of Michigan's un-
dergraduate admissions policies").
136. See Barbara Lauriat, Note, Trump Card or Trouble? The Diversity Ratio-
nale in Law and Education, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2003) (outlining the his-
tory of "diversity" in education admission policies).
137. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).
138. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 13).
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mass'139 of minority students,"140 where the "concept of critical
mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that di-
versity is designed to produce."'' Therefore, whether the Law
School has a compelling interest to justify the use of race 42 in
law school admissions is dependent upon the benefits of diver-
sity, which were succinctly outlined by the Court and discussed
infra in this article.
1. Bakke's "race" legacy
The last time that the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of race was 25 years ago in the landmark Bakke decision. 43 In
that case, the Court addressed the issue of a racial set-aside
program in which the Court invalidated the set-aside program,
but reversed the state court's injunction against any use of race
whatsoever.' 44 The Court held that a "[sitate has a substantial
interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin." 145 Since then, Bakke has served as the
"touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious 46 ad-
missions policies."147 Justice Powell's premise was that when
government decisions touch on an individual's race or ethnic
background, a judicial inquiry148 would seek a precisely tailored
basis, 4s serving a compelling governmental interest. 5 o He,
139. See cf Muddled, supra note 133, at 1 (stating that "[tihis is the ultimate
triumph of form over substance, once the Court accepted racial diversity in higher
education as a compelling interest, it is struck with a racial quota system, albeit a
soft quota. Calling it a 'critical mass' does not change that.")
140. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
142. See Lauriat, supra note 136, at 1197 (discussing "Racial Diversity").
143. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. See also Kenneth L. Karst, Symposium, The
Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 60 (2004)[hereinafter Karst] (stating that "when the Bakke case came before the Court, the
appropriate standard of review for affirmative action was still an open question").
144. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272.
145. Id. at 320.
146. See generally Lawrence, supra note 54 (challenging affirmative action
and asking whether diversity justifies race-conscious admissions programs).
147. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307.
148. See Ibrahim, supra note 56, at 914 (discussing the evolution of the strict
scrutiny test in racial classifications).
149. But cf. Ibrahim, supra note 56, at 930 (arguing that the law school's ad-
mission policy was not narrowly tailored).
150. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
[Vol. 25:91
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss1/4
20041 IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY 113
therefore, approved the university's use of race to further "the
attainment of a diverse student body"15 with the condition that
"constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not
be disregarded. " 15 2 But race is only one element in a range of
factors 53 for evaluating qualifications and characteristics.
54
Justice Powell states that "tradition and experience lend sup-
port to the view that the contribution of diversity is substan-
tial." 55 Justice O'Connor, articulating the decision for the
majority states, "today we endorse Justice Powell's view that
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can
justify the use of race in university admissions."156
2. Race as a "Plus Factor"
A university may use "race" in its admission process, but
only as a "plus factor" in context of individualized consideration
of each and every applicant's file, 57 without "insulating the in-
dividual applicant from comparison with all other candidates
for the available seats," as was done in Bakke 58 and subse-
quently Hopwood. 59  Citing Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 60 the Court states that "'a permissible goal'. . . permits
consideration of race as a 'plus factor' in any given case while
still ensuring that each candidate 'compete[s] with all other
qualified applicants.'"' 6' But in Johnson, the issue was not
race; it was gender. 62 In Johnson, a female employee was pro-
151. Id. at 311.
152. Id. at 314.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 315.
155. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
156. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325. But see Bell, supra note 76, at 1622, 1625 (ar-
guing that diversity avoids addressing directly barriers of race and class, and that
the concept of diversity is similar to "affirmative action" policies which invite fur-
ther litigation).
157. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
158. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 (stating that the Medical School had a rigid 16-
seat quota).
159. Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994). See also William C. Kid-
der, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent Developments in Litigation,
Admissions and Diversity Research, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 173 (2001).
160. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987).
161. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers Int'l v. EEOC,
478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638).
162. Johnson, 480 U.S. 616.
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moted to a skilled-crafted job over an equally qualified male em-
ployee under an affirmative action plan.16 3 The Court stated
that a county agency was authorized to consider as one selec-
tion factor the sex of a qualified applicant, and that the consid-
eration of the female applicant's sex was lawful.164
Justice Powell, in Bakke, rejects the notion that using race
as a plus factor or giving greater "weight" to race than to some
other factors to achieve student body diversity is a quota.165
But the fact that the "race plus factor" is not a quota does not
make it legitimate unless the university "remains flexible
enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individ-
ual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity
the defining feature of his or her application."166 The context of
a race conscious admissions program is paramount. 167
E. Benefits of Diversity
One of the fundamental issues before the Court in the Grut-
ter case was whether the law school admission policy's use of
race classification was justified by a compelling governmental
interest. Justice O'Connor concluded that the Law School's jus-
tification for the use of race here is "the educational benefits
that flow from a diverse student body." 168 What, then, are the
benefits of the Law School's diversity admissions policy that the
Court sees as substantial for overcoming the burden of the use
of race?:
1. The "admissions policy promotes 'cross-racial understand-
ing,' helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables
[students] to better understand persons of different
races.'"169
2. "'[Cllassroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply
more enlightening and interesting' when the students have
'the greatest possible variety of backgrounds. ' 1 70
163. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634.
164. Id. at 641.
165. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18.
166. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 330 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 246a).
170. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 246a, 244a).
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3. "Diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares
students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society
and better prepares them as professionals."
171
4. "[Sikills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."
1 72
5. "[Olpportunit[ies] through public institutions of higher edu-
cation must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race
or ethnicity" if we are to maintain the very foundation of
good citizenship. 73
6. "Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups in the civic life our Nation is essential if the dream of
one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."
74
7. "[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools represent the
training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders,"
such as in Congress, and court rooms.
75
8. "[L] aw schools 'cannot be effective in isolation from the indi-
viduals and institutions with which the law interacts."
' 176
F. Benefits of Diversity in the Military
The military is an institution that has been attempting to
make strides in diversifying the ranks of the officer corps. For
example, in 2001, the active officer corps in the United Army
was composed of officers graduating from the Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC), the U.S. Army Academy, Officers Can-
didate School (OCS) and direct appointment. 177 Demographics
171. Id. (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al.
as Amici Curiae 3); See also William Bowen & Derek Bok, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER
(Princeton Univ. Press 1998); DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001).
172. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
173. See id. at 331.
174. Id. at 332.
175. Id; see also Karst, supra note 140, at 61 (noting that "no longer is the
Court limiting its compelling-state-interest discussion to the educational experi-
ence in the classrooms and on the campuses. Now the Court has highlighted the
nation's compelling interest in integrated leadership of our institutions.").
176. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
(holding that the equal protection clause required that the applicant be admitted
to the University of Texas Law School, since the school for African Americans
(Texas Southern University) did not afford equal facilities)).
177. See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PERSONNEL AND READ-
INESS, POPULATION REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2001
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of these institutions shows that Whites, who represent 75% of
the United States Population graduate 76.4% from the ROTC
Program, 85.45% from the Academy, 74.7% from OCS and
78.7% by Direct Commission appointment. 178 On the other
hand, Blacks, who represent 12% of the United State popula-
tion, graduated 13.6% from the ROTC Program, 5.6% from the
Academy, 15.2% from OCS and 10.7% from Direct Commission.
Hispanics, who represent 13% of the population, graduated
4.6% from ROTC, 3.3% from the Academy, 5.0% from OCS and
3.7% from Direct Commissions. 179 The total number of active
white officers in the U.S. Army in 2001 was 50,543 (78.0%).180
The total number of Black officers was 7,697 (11.8%), and the
total number of Hispanics was 2,784 (4.2%).181
The United States Air Force officer corps is currently at-
tempting to reach the same level of diversity as the Army. For
example, in 2001, the active officer corps in the United Air
Force was composed of officers graduating from the Air Force
Reserve Officer Training Corp (AFROTC), the U.S. Air Force
Academy, Officers Training School and others.18 2 Whites, who
represent 75% of the United States population graduated 88%
from the Air Force Academy, 88.3% from the AFROTC, and
88.6% from the Officers Training School. 8 3 On the other hand,
Blacks graduated 5.0% from the Academy, 13.7% from ROTC
and 5.2% from the Officer Training School. 8 4 Hispanics, who
represent 13% of the United States population, graduated 2.9%
officers from the Academy, 2.04% from the AFROTC, and 2.90%
from Officers Training School. 8 5
It is obvious that these two national institutions that train
individuals for leadership in the military service and for leader-
app. B (Tbl. B-43) (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.dod.mil/prhome/
poprep2001/appendixb/b_43.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PERSONNEL AND READI-
NESS, POPULATION REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2001
app. B (Tbl. B-43) (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.dod.mil/prhome/poprep
2001/appendixb/b_43.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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ship in the civilian world would benefit immensely from diver-
sity programs to achieve their goals. 8 6 The United States
military states that '[biased on [their] decades of experience,' a
'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to
the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide
national security."' 8 7 O'Connor continues:
The primary sources for the Nation's officer corps are the service
academies and the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), the
latter comprising [ofi students already admitted to participating
colleges and universities. At present, "the military cannot achieve
an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse
unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited race-
conscious recruiting and admission policies." (emphasis in origi-
nal). To fulfill its mission, the military "must be selective in ad-
missions for training and education for the officer corps, and it
must train and educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps in a racially diverse setting." [emphasis added]. We agree
that "[iut requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude
that our country's other most selective institutions must remain
both diverse and selective." 18
8
G. Achieving Diversity Through Critical Mass
The Plaintiff argues that she "was rejected because the Law
School uses race as a 'predominant' factor, giving applications
belonging to certain minority groups a significantly greater
chance of admission than students with similar credentials
from disfavored racial groups." 8 9 Additionally, Dr. Kinley
Larntz presents evidence that race should not be the predomi-
nant factor in the Law School's admission process that students
from different groups have equal chance of admission when
186. See Karst, supra note 140, at 66 (analyzing the amicus submitted by the
military sketching the painful history of racial integration in the services, notably
including the racial tensions that led to incidents of violence in the ranks during
the Vietnam war, materially interfering with the Army's mission).
187. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. Amici
Curiae at 27, (U.S. Feb. 21, 2003), reprinted at 2003 WL 1787554 (stating that
"because racial diversity in higher education also is necessary to integrate the of-
ficer corps and to train and educate white and minority officers, it is essential to
ensuring an effective, battle-ready fighting force.")).
188. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (internal quotations omitted).
189. Id. at 317.
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they are equally qualified. 190 But commentators argue that
Larntz's framework disfavors minority groups, with greater dis-
favor for minorities with a small population. 19' The Law
School's admission policy is to admit both minorities and non-
minorities through a "critical mass"' 9 2 diversity program, which
the court adopts in its opinion. 93 "'[Ciritical mass means
'meaningful numbers' or 'meaningful representation,"' which is
further defined as "'a number that encourages under-
represented minority students to participate in the classroom
and not feel isolated."' 9 4 It is defined by reference to the educa-
tional benefits that diversity is designed to produce. 195 There is
no number, percentage, range of numbers, or range of percent-
ages that constitute "critical mass." 9 6 The concept is not quan-
tified.197 "'Some attention to numbers, without more, does not
transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota."98
"Critical mass," said the court, therefore, is not a quota. 99 The
purpose of "critical mass" is to ensure that underrepresented
minority students are included so as to realize the educational
benefits of a diverse student body.200 The Court argues that
when minority students "are present, racial stereotypes lose
their force because non- minority students learn there is no 'mi-
nority viewpoint' but rather a variety of viewpoints among mi-
nority students."201  "By enrolling a 'critical mass' of
190. Id. at 320.
191. See generally David M. White, The Requirement of Race-Conscious Eval-
uation of LSAT Score for Equitable Law School Admissions, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA
L.J. 359, 418 (2001) (discussing Dr. Larntz's opinion that the University of Michi-
gan Law School is preferring less qualified minority applicants over better quali-
fied white applicants).
192. See BErrY FREIDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 21 (1963). One of the first
references to "critical mass" was in Betty Freidan's book where she states, "for
women may have to reach a point of critical mass in any institution to raise that
different voice, and the institution may have to face its own critical crisis to hear
it." Id.
193. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-16; see also Lauriat, supra note 133, at 1173-74
(outlining the history of "Diversity" in Education Admissions Policies).
194. Id. at 318 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 208a-209a).
195. Id. at 319.
196. Id. at 318.
197. Id.
198. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323).
199. Id. at 335.
200. Id. at 316.
201. Id. at 319-20 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 215a).
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underrepresented minority students, the Law School seeks to
'ensur[e] their ability to make unique contributions to the char-
acter of the Law School.' , 202 Giving deference to the Law School
with respect to its admission policies, the Court states that the
"[sichool has determined, based on its experience and expertise,
that a 'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is neces-
sary to further its compelling interest in securing the educa-
tional benefits of a diverse student body."203
H. Narrowly Tailoring Compelling Interest
Although the Court determined that critical mass is neces-
sary, as mentioned above, strict scrutiny must be applied when
imposing racial classifications. 20 4 Strict scrutiny20 5 requires
that the compelling governmental interest be narrowly tailored
to pass constitutional muster.206 "[Grutter] and the United
States argue that the Law School's plan is not narrowly tai-
lored 207 because race-neutral means exist to obtain the educa-
tional benefits of student body diversity the Law School
202. Id. at 316 (quoting App. at 120-21).
203. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
204. Id. at 327; see also Adarand Constructors., 515 U.S. at 227 (where the
court first announced that federal affirmative action programs would be subject to
"strict scrutiny").
205. See Libby Huskey, Constitutional Law-Affirmative Action in Higher
Education -Strict in Theory, Intermediate in Fact? Grutter v. Bollinger, 4 Wyo. L.
REV. 439, 441-42 (2004) (arguing (1) that the Grutter court conceived and applied a
more deferential form of strict scrutiny than had been used in prior affirmative-
action cases, (2) altering the strict scrutiny analysis in this manner served to con-
fuse the decision and undermine the well-established strict scrutiny test, and (3)
instead of weakening the strict scrutiny test, the court should have broken from
precedent and explicitly upheld the law school's program under intermediate
scrutiny).
206. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F. 3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (the first
federal court of appeals to evaluate a university's affirmative action policy on nar-
row tailoring grounds); Recent Case, Circuit Holds that University's Race-Con-
scious Admissions Policy is Unconstitutional-Johnson v. Board of Regents of the
University of Georgia, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1239 (2002) (analyzing the concept of
"narrow tailoring").
207. See generally Ian Ayres, Symposium on Affirmative Action: Narrow Tai-
loring, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1781 (1996) (arguing that the courts preference for "race-
neutral means to increase minority participation" is inconsistent with narrow tai-
loring and may not be a less restrictive alternative than explicit racial
classifications).
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seeks."208 Their argument is based on footnote 6 in the Wygant
decision.20 9 But the court refutes this argument and states that
"Mnarrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceiv-
able race-neutral alternative," yet it does require "good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives [to] achieve
the diversity the university seeks".210 The court concluded "that
the Law School sufficiently considered workable race-neutral
alternatives ... without forcing the Law School to abandon the
academic selectivity that is the cornerstone of its educational
mission."211
1. Individualized Consideration
Then, if strict scrutiny21 2 requires that the compelling gov-
ernmental interest 21 3 be narrowly tailored to pass constitutional
muster, "narrow tailoring"214 requires that "in the context of its
208. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339; see generally Kevin Joyner, The Use of Race in
the Admissions Programs of Higher Educational Institutions-A Violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 489 (1997).
209. 476 U.S. at 280 n.6. "The term 'narrowly tailored,' so frequently used in
our cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators
have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of whether lawful
alternatives and less restrictive means could have been used." Id. See also John
H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REV.
723, 727 n.26 (1974) (noting that the classification at issue must "fit" with greater
precision than any alternative means); Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Be-
nign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 578-79
(1975) ("stating that [courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a
nonracial approach or a more narrowly-tailored racial classification could promote
the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense").
210. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40 (emphasis added) (stating that the Law
School did not have to consider "using a lottery system" or "decreasing the empha-
sis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores" as race neutral al-
ternative or a "percentage plan"); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (stating that
narrow tailoring requires "lawful alternatives and less restrictive means").
211. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
212. See generally Jaideep Venkatesan, Fatal In Fact?: Federal Courts'Appli-
cation of Strict Scrutiny to Racial Preferences in Public Education, 6 TEX. F. ON
C.L. & C.R. 173 (2001) (arguing that courts have applied a "contextual strict scru-
tiny", rather than different strict scrutiny frameworks for different government
classifications, dependent upon whether government is acting as a contractor, sub-
sidizer, employer, or educator).
213. Id. at 175 (discussing two characteristics of compelling interest: (1) the
kinds of interests that are acceptable and (2) the evidence required to show that an
acceptable compelling justification in fact exist).
214. See generally Ayres, supra note 195 (discussing the case history of nar-
row tailoring).
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individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions
of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions
program may not unduly [favor racial and ethnic groups, and at
the same time,] harm non-minority applicants."215 Therefore,
as long as the Law School utilizes race in a race conscious ad-
missions program as a "plus factor," and not as its sole criteria,
in the context of individualized consideration,216 a rejected
applicant
will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat
simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong sur-
name ... His qualification would have been weighted fairly and
competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal
treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. 217
The importance of individualized consideration in the context of
a race-conscious admissions program is paramount. 218
2. Law School's Individualized Holistic Considerations
Justice O'Connor held that the University of Michigan
properly utilized a highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environ-
ment.21 9 The criteria and considerations that the court requires
to pass muster for race-conscious admission programs are that:
(1) there be no automatic acceptance or rejection based on any
215. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. See also Lawrence, supra note 54 (discussing
Race-Conscious Admissions Programs); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 630 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (promoting minority ownership by the FCC of broadcast
stations through its "distress sale" policy, which awarded an enhancement credit
for ownership and participation by members of minority groups. It held that the
policy did not violate equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment because
the policy did not "impose impermissible burdens on non-minorities.").
216. See Robert A. Sedler, Affirmative Action, Race, and the Constitution:
From Bakke to Grutter, 92 Ky. L.J. 219, 237 (2003-2004) (discussing "individual-
ized consideration" and comparing it with University of Michigan undergraduate
admissions program that mechanically assigned a number of points for different
factors including 5 points for male nurses, 20 points for athletes, 20 points for
provost's discretion and 20 points for minorities).
217. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
218. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (stating that the
denial of the right to "individualize consideration" was the "principal evil" of the
medical school's admissions program).
219. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
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single "soft" variable, 220 (2) there be no mechanical predeter-
mined diversity "bonuses" based on race or ethnicity, 221 (3) the
admission policy is flexible enough to consider all pertinent ele-
ments of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of
each individual applicant, 222 (4) all pertinent elements be placed
on the same footing for consideration, (5) but "not necessarily
according them the same weight,"223 (6) the policy adequately
ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body di-
versity are meaningfully considered alongside race in the ad-
mission decision,224 (7) all admitted students, minority [and
non-minority] be deemed qualified,225 and (8) the law school
considers the student's experiences of particular importance to
the law school.226
Examples of a student experience of particular importance
to the law school include "applicants who lived or traveled
widely abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome
personal adversity and family hardship, have an exceptional re-
cord of extensive community service, and have had successful
careers in other fields."227 In addition, other considerations for
admissions may include the "applicant's promise of making a
notable contribution to the class by a particular strength, at-
tainment or characteristic [such as] unusual intellectual
achievement, employment experience, nonacademic perform-
ance, or personal background."22 But race is still an important
factor in a race-conscious admissions program because "'when
the committee on admission reviews the large middle group of
applicants who are 'admissible' and deemed capable of doing
220. Id.
221. Id. See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 538 U.S. 904 (2003) (finding that the un-
dergraduate school had allocated bonus points by (1) Geography (2) Alumni (3)
Essay (4) Personal Achievement (5) Leadership and Service and (6)
Miscellaneous).
222. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. For example, the Law School gives substantial
weight to diversity factors besides race when it frequently accepts non-minority
applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority ap-
plicants and other non-minority applicants. Id.
223. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
224. Id. at 338.
225. Id. at 337.
226. Id. at 338.
227. Id.
228. Grutter, 538 U.S. at 338.
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good work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the
balance in her favor."' 229
Therefore, the court concluded that "in the context of its in-
dividualized, [holistic] inquiry into the possible diversity contri-
butions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious
admissions program d[id] not unduly harm nonminority
applicants."230
IV. The Sun Sets on Racial Preference in 2028
Finally, Justice O'Connor avers that, "[wie expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today."231 There are
several interesting questions that spring from this commentary.
First, does this mean that the issue of racial preferences in edu-
cation is constitutional today, but will become unconstitutional
in 25 years? Or does it mean that the court's position is uncon-
stitutional now, but that it will waive the unconstitutional in-
fraction for the next 25 years? Moreover, is there an
implication in the commentary that within 25 years the issues
related to race relative to education will be eradicated and judi-
cial protection of minorities in education will become unneces-
sary? Finally, if the issue of racial preference arises in the year
2029 it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will have the same
judicial composition. Whether or not racial preferences will
need to be taken into account to attain the aforementioned edu-
cational and social benefits by 2028 remains to be seen. But con-
sidering race in the context of United States economic, social,
political and legal history, twenty-five years seems more like a
distant hope than an achievable reality.
V. Conclusion
The Grutter case has brought us full circle from President
Kennedy's vision to "take affirmative action to ensure" practices
are free of racial bias,232 and President Johnson's pledge to seek
"not just equality as a right and theory, but equality as a fact
229. Id. at 339 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316).
230. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 343.
232. See Kennedy, supra note 2.
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and equality as a result"233 to Justice O'Connor's conclusion
that by 2028 judicial attention to the issue of race, affirmative
action and preference will no longer be necessary.
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke seems to be the pivotal
point from which legal theory and the idea of race-conscious
programs are anchored. Slowly, over time, the affirmative ac-
tion equal protection legal framework began to morph into the
concept of "diversity" and the question became whether a
state's educational institutions have a compelling governmental
interest to use race to diversify their campuses. At least for the
next twenty-five years, it is settled that diversity may only be
achieved through "critical mass," that racial classification will
be subjected to strict scrutiny, and that the state compelling in-
terest must be narrowly tailored. Grutter teaches us that a
state interest is narrowly tailored when the university uses race
as a plus factor, and student applications are viewed and given
individualized consideration, not point allocation. In didactic
fashion, Grutter outlines, with great specificity, the criteria for
individualized consideration to pass constitutional muster for
race-conscious admission program.
The social progression of race relations in America has been
reflected in the history of affirmative action through congres-
sional legislation and American jurisprudence. The history of
affirmative action teaches us that we started with a great
dream - "[w]e seek not just freedom but opportunity ... not just
legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and
theory, but equality as a fact and as a result."234 Slowly, the Su-
preme Court is working itself through the jurisprudential web
of rights and theory.
233. See Johnson, supra note 4.
234. Id. (emphasis added).
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